

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

Case No. IT-09-92-T

IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER

Before: Judge Alphons Orie, Presiding
Judge Bakone Justice Moloto
Judge Christoph Flügge

Registrar: Mr. John Hocking

Date Filed: 3 November 2014

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

RATKO MLADIĆ

PUBLIC

**DEFENCE MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 92TER TO ADMIT THE WRITTEN
TESTIMONY OF BOŠKO AMIDŽIĆ**

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Peter McCloskey
Ms. Camille Bibles

Counsel for the Accused:

Mr. Branko Lukić
Mr. Miodrag Stojanović

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The Accused, **RATKO MLADIĆ**, by and through his counsel of record, respectfully submits the instant Motion pursuant to Rule 92*ter* of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and in support thereof states as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to the Guidance previously expressed by the Trial Chamber, motions offering written statements under Rule 92*ter* of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are to be filed at least 30 days before the anticipated testimony of a given witness. Witness Boško Amidžić is currently scheduled to testify the week starting 24 November 2014 and thus the Defense hereby files the instant motion in compliance with the Chamber's guidance, and applying for the evidence of this witness to be heard pursuant to Rule 92*ter*. This Motion is filed publicly, as the witness does not require protective measures.

2. Herein this application is made to tender one written witness statement of the witness, without associated exhibits. At this time the Defense estimates that the evidence-in-chief of this witness will last up to 30 minutes.

3. The Defense does not otherwise seek to deviate from the Chamber's Guidelines in tendering this witness' evidence.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

4. Under Rule 92*ter* of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter "Rules") a Trial Chamber is permitted to admit the evidence in whole or in part in the form of a witness statement or transcripts of a proceeding before the Tribunal, under the following conditions: i) the witness is present in court; ii) the witness is available for cross-examination and any questioning by the Judges; and iii) the witness attests that the written statement or transcript accurately reflects the witness's declaration and what the witness would say if examined.¹

5. A party calling a witness pursuant to Rule 92*ter* may seek to admit into evidence documents that have been discussed by the witness in his or her witness statement of previous testimony.²

III. DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS

The Chamber Should Admit the Witness Statement

6. Witness Amidžić's statement is relevant, reliable and probative, as set forth in greater detail herein below.

¹ Rule 92*ter* of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

² *Prosecutor v. Karadzic*, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, "Decision on Prosecution's Submission regarding Additional Transcript Pages from Momcilo Mandić's Stanisic and Zupljanin Testimony for Admission into Evidence." 8 September 2010, para.5.

7. The witness will be present at trial, and thus will be able to attest to the evidence and will be available to be cross-examined by the Prosecution. Thereby the requirements of Rule 92*ter* will be fulfilled, and fairness to the Prosecution will be observed.

8. The Defense submits that due to the nature of the witness's testimony 30 minutes will be necessary in order to conduct a limited and focused direct examination of the witness to clarify, expand on, and contextualize aspects of his evidence directly relevant to the Defense case.

9. In 1972, the witness Amidžić was Chief of Quartermaster Service of the 329th Armoured Brigade stationed at the Kozara Barracks. In 1979 he became the Chief of Quartermaster Service of the Banja Luka based 5th Division Command, which was reorganised into the 5th Corps. When the VRS was established, the witness became Chief of Quartermaster Service for the 1st Krajina Corps. On 14 February 1993 he was appointed Assistant Commander of Logistics, and retired on 31 July 1997.

10. Witness Amidžić's testimony is relevant to and probative of salient and material issues pertaining to the Indictment. The Defense is confident in that it will, among other things, establish the following:

- a. The movements of brigades from the 5th Banja Luka Corps Units sent to Western Slavonia.³
- b. JNA military equipment travelling by train from Slovenia to Serbia was stopped in Okučani. Colonel Milan Čeleketić arrived from Bjelovar in order to clear a passage for the cargo through Slavonia.⁴
- c. Inhabitants of Serb villages in the area of Papuk Mountain, from Našice to Virovitica, had to leave.⁵

³ Statement, para.3.

⁴ Statement, para.4.

⁵ Statement, para.6.

- d. The creation and operation of buffer zones to separate the Croats and Serbs resulted in mistrust from Serbs in the area. Requests from locals for weapons were denied unless they became members of the JNA.⁶
- e. Units were relocated from Western Slavonia to Krajina in 1992 according to an agreement between the JNA and UNPROFOR, which assumed responsibility for the protection of the population in the buffer zones.⁷
- f. The primary command post of the 1st Krajina Corps was located in Banja Luka and the forward command post was in Prnjavor.⁸
- g. The nature, structure, and zone of responsibility of the 1st Krajina Corps.⁹
- h. The role of, and procedures followed by, the logistics service in the provision of weaponry and general resources,¹⁰ and the duties of the Chief of Quartermaster Service.¹¹
- i. On 5 March 1993, the combat readiness of the Army of Republika Srpska's logistics support for the year 1992 was assessed as having been carried out in conditions of extreme shortage of financial and material means.¹²
- j. Combat activities of Muslim paramilitary forces and the Croat Defence Council (hereafter 'HVO') cut off traffic on the Banja Luka – Prnjavor road. The area was isolated with only the air line from Belgrade to Banja Luka in service. The telephone, postal services, and payment system were cut off, and the delivery of supplies was disrupted.¹³

⁶ Statement, para.7.

⁷ Statement, paras.8-9.

⁸ Statement, para.10.

⁹ Statement, para.11.

¹⁰ Statement, para.12.

¹¹ Statement, paras.16-17.

¹² Statement, paras.13-15.

¹³ Statement, para.18.

- k.** The decision on ‘Operation corridor-92’ was made on 12 June 1992. The opening of the corridor began on 26 June 1992¹⁴ and combat activities of the 1st Krajina Corps continued.¹⁵
- l.** The Manjača prisoner of war camp, led by Colonel Vaso Tepšić, was established on orders received on 26 May 1992.¹⁶ The role, responsibilities, and tasks of the Quartermaster involved in the establishment and running of the camp.¹⁷ The preparation and distribution of meals was organised by the prisoners.¹⁸
- m.** The unit’s inspections of Manjača camp were monitored by representatives of the International Red Cross, Merhamet, and Caritas.¹⁹ These representatives were allowed to visit at their own request and no requests were denied.²⁰
- n.** Anything that could be arranged through humanitarian organisations was allowed at the camp. Representatives of humanitarian societies brought eating utensils, dinnerware, dishwashing detergent and personal hygiene items, and medicine to prisoners.²¹
- o.** It is not true 40 prisoners were killed at the Manjača camp and that 15 people disappeared from the city prison and later found to be deceased.²²
- p.** The Mali Novi Logor barracks in Banja Luka was a military investigative prison. Detainees were mostly military personnel and were only kept during an inquiry into allegations of criminal offences.²³ This detention facility was not a typical prison. Visits to

¹⁴ Statement, paras.20-21.

¹⁵ Statement, para.22.

¹⁶ Statement, paras.25-26.

¹⁷ Statement, paras.26-29, 31.

¹⁸ Statement, para.30.

¹⁹ Statement, para.34.

²⁰ Statement, paras.35-36.

²¹ Statement, paras.37-38.

²² Statement, paras.39-40.

²³ Statement, para.42.

the facility were undertaken by representatives of the International Red Cross.²⁴

- q.** General Ratko Mladić ordered the reception and accommodation of the Croatian population fleeing Central Bosnia in June 1993. The population was provided with food, water, and medical aid²⁵ and was subsequently transported to destinations of their choice.²⁶ Members of the HVO agreed to surrender their weapons and be temporarily accommodated at Manjača, which was not functioning as a prison at that time. These members did not have the status of prisoners of war and were subsequently transported through the territory of Republika Srpska to join HVO forces.²⁷
- r.** The 1st Krajina Corps was unaware the rebellion of 10 September 1993 would take place.²⁸ General Mladić arrived in Banja Luka and issued an order for the return of the units.²⁹
- s.** There was no ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population of Banja Luka during the war.³⁰ A considerable number of non-Serb officers remained in the 1st Krajina Corps.³¹
- t.** Corps Command never ordered the destruction of religious facilities in Banja Luka or elsewhere in its zone of responsibility, and written orders prohibiting the destruction of religious sites were issued. Such destruction did occur but was carried out by individuals not under Corps command.³²
- u.** When the VRS was established in May 1992, all units were given a memorandum from the Main Staff stating officers were to decide

²⁴ Statement, paras.43-45.

²⁵ Statement, paras.46-47, 50.

²⁶ Statement, para.48.

²⁷ Statement, para.49.

²⁸ Statement, para.52.

²⁹ Statement, paras.55-56.

³⁰ Statement, para.57.

³¹ Statement, para.58.

³² Statement, para.59.

whether they wished to stay in the BiH and VRS, or continue their service in the FRY.³³

- v. The duties and responsibilities of the Commander of the 14th Logistics Base in Banja Luka.³⁴
- w. The circumstances surrounding the retirement of Colonel Osman Selak.³⁵

III. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing arguments, the Defense respectfully requests that the Chamber issue an order:

- a. Granting the Defense leave to call Boško Amidžić as a witness pursuant to Rule 92*ter*.
- b. Granting the Defense leave to admit the proffered statement, (attached hereto as Annex A) under Rule 92*ter*.

Word Count: 1,374

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY:



Branko Lukić
Lead Counsel for Ratko Mladić



Miodrag Stojanović
Co-Counsel for Ratko Mladić

³³ Statement, para.65.

³⁴ Statement, paras.64, 66.

³⁵ Statement, paras.66-71.

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ANNEX A

**INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991**

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Surname: AMIDŽIĆ

Name: Boško

Father's name: Risto

Date of birth: 25 November 1945

Ethnicity: Serb

Date(s) of interview(s): 22 February 2014

Interview(s) conducted by: Branko Lukić, Mikajlo Mitrović

Language used during the interview: Serbian

Signature of the Witness: / *signature* /

WITNESS STATEMENT

1. My name is Boško Amidžić, son of Risto; I was born on 25 November 1945 in the village of Veliko Blaško, the Municipality of Laktaši. I completed elementary school in Laktaši and the high school of economics in Banja Luka, and I graduated from the Military Academy of Economics in 1970. In 1981 I went to the Command Staff Academy.

2. I started working in Banja Luka in 1970 as a quartermaster platoon commander in the Armoured and Mechanised Units Centre. In 1972, I became the Chief of Quartermaster Service of the 329th Armoured Brigade, which was stationed in the Kozara Barracks. Afterwards, I was engaged on various duties. In 1979, I came to the Banja Luka-based 5th Division Command as the Chief of Quartermaster Service. The Division was later reorganised into the 5th Corps, in which I continued to perform the duty of Chief of Quartermaster Service. When the VRS was established, I became a member of the 1st Krajina Corps in the capacity of Chief of Quartermaster Service. I was appointed Assistant Commander for Logistics on 14 February 1993, and I got retired at personal request on 31 July 1997.

THE PARTICIPATION OF THE 5TH (BANJA LUKA) CORPS UNITS IN THE WAR IN CROATIA

3. Parts of the 5th Corps were deployed in Western Slavonia, which was in the zone of responsibility of the Corps. I would go to the field and visit the units. The first elements to go to Western Slavonia were parts of the 329th Armoured Brigade, parts of the 16th mtbr */Motorised Brigade/*, parts of the 343rd Motorised Brigade (mtbr), parts of the 2nd Krajina Brigade and parts of the 122nd Infantry Brigade. These parts of the brigades were sent to Western Slavonia to separate the already warring sides and peoples, namely, the Serbs and the Croats.

4. When I went to Okučani, there were cargoes of JNA military equipment stopped there; they were on the way from Slovenia to Serbia. Lieutenant Colonel Milan Čeleketić came from Bjelovar on that occasion in order to clear the passage for the transports through Slavonia and further on. The cargoes were carried by train.

5. Milan Čeleketić could no longer return to Bijelovar because the road towards Bjelovar had been cut off.
6. I remember that inhabitants of 72 Serb villages had to leave the area of Mountain Papuk at that time, along the stretch from Našice to Virovitica.
7. The Serbs were mistrustful of us, the members and units of the JNA, which was still of mixed ethnic composition at that time. We created buffer zones between the Serbs and the Croats in order to have them separated. We did not allow any armed persons to cross the area we kept. We did not let armed locals through, unless they were in the unit. This is the reasons why they were mistrustful. We attempted to organise them into a unit. They would ask for weapons, but we did not let them have it. They would be given weapons only if they joined the JNA. However, when we would come to recruit them, no one would show up. For that reason we did not issue them any weapons.
8. The units were subsequently relocated from Western Slavonia according to the plan agreed between the JNA and the UNPROFOR, which took over from the JNA the role of protecting the population in the buffer zones.
9. I remember being medically treated at the VMA */Military Medical Academy/* for two weeks in 1992, and it was in that period that a part of the 5th Corps moved from Western Slavonia to the area of Krajina.

THE FIRST KRAJINA CORPS

10. The primary command post was in Banja Luka. A narrower part of the command, including the commander, the chief of staff, a clerk from the operations section, the chief of communications, were in Prnjavor where the forward command post had been established. I remained at the primary command post in Banja Luka and was responsible for its functioning. I was designated the commander of the primary command post.
11. The 1st KK */Krajina Corps/* was the largest unit of the operational and strategic level; it consisted of up to 48 units ranked as regiments or brigades; its zone of responsibility included 30 of the total of 60 municipalities in Republika Srpska, 1159 inhabited places, which comprised 50% of Republika Srpska. The zone of responsibility covered 16,650 square

kilometres. The total area of BiH is 51,242 km², and Republika Srpska, with its area of 34,650 km², comprised 68% of the area of BiH at that time (1993).

THE IMPORTANCE OF LOGISTICS

12. No weapons and equipment can be cleared for readiness for any decision of the commander without the logistics service previously ensuring the conditions for a successful implementation of the decision. There is no readiness for an action or operation without the confirmation that the logistics service can successfully provide resources for it. Moreover, I must emphasise that the rear (logistic) service includes a much wider range of support, such as quartermaster provisions (food, clothes, footwear, personal and collective hygiene items, quartermaster equipment, etc.), as well as transport, medical, veterinary, construction and other provisions.

13. Working in the conditions of disrupted production structure, which was far from meeting the regular needs of the army and the population, I often had to improvise by decreasing the norms of expenditure, shifting priorities, etc.

14. On 5 March 1993, I was present at the analysis of combat readiness of the Army of Republika Srpska for the year 1992. On that occasion, it was, *inter alia*, noted that the Army had fulfilled its task in all aspects, that some decisive steps in the finalisation of defence of the fatherland were before us, and that they were only possible through absolute unity of the people and the Army. Each element of combat readiness was analysed on that occasion, and the logistics support in particular.

15. It was concluded that the combat activities were thus far carried out in the conditions characterised by extreme shortage of financial and material means and fuel, with rather limited or inadequate operation of our own production and service capacities (3-7%), and with very scarce material reserves at all levels. It was generally assessed that it had practically been a fight for survival. As early as from that time, and until the end of the war, we had to purchase ammunition and other resources necessary for waging a war.

16. The structure of the logistics support and the tasks I only partially mentioned above are indicative of the complexity of the combat system which I managed successfully, according to the evaluation of my commander and the Main Staff. I ensured the conditions necessary for successful implementation of their decisions in combat.

17. I managed a large number of individuals within this system, and only at the Corps Command level, in my logistics sector, about 30 to 34 personnel of different ranks and specialties were directly subordinated to me. I do not count here the structure and personnel of the executive logistics units within the composition of the Corps.

THE FIGHTS FOR OPENING THE CORRIDOR - "THE ROAD OF LIFE"

18. With the dissolution of the country came the dissolution of the logistics system of the former JNA, which largely depended on the influence and force of the then paramilitary structures of the secessionist republics. At that time, very intense combat activities of the Muslim paramilitary forces and the HVO */Croat Defence Council/* forces were occurring south of the Sava River. Due to these combat activities, the traffic on the road Banja Luka - Prnjavor - Bijeljina was cut off (the HVO forces reached from Bosanski Brod as far as the outskirts of Doboje, to the village of Kotorsko, while the Muslim forces on the south side came as close as Putnikovo Brdo and the confluence of the Usora and the Bosna rivers). Practically, there remained between 6 and 8 kilometres, as the crow flies, that kept Republika Srpska from being definitively split into two parts.

19. At the same time, the telephone and postal (PTT) services and payment system were cut off, and only the air line from Banja Luka to Belgrade was still in service, though very crowded and uncertain. No delivery of supplies was possible, i.e. it was disrupted. The isolation of this area began in every sense. In such circumstances we relied only on local capacities, and were preparing for work in privation. There was not enough food, medicines and fuel, neither for the army nor for the population. Twelve babies died in the hospital in Banja Luka because there was no oxygen to be administered, and dialysis and other critical patients were in danger.

20. Such a situation prompted the military and civilian authorities towards a more decisive stance that it was necessary to open the "Road of Life" by military means towards the Drina River and the eastern parts of Republika Srpska and the FRY */Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/*. The decision on "Operation Corridor-92" was made on 12 June 1992.

21. The Operation had several stages, and the opening of the corridor itself was implemented on 26 June as part of the first stage.

22. Combat activities continued after the opening of the corridor, and they were carried out by the 1st Krajina Corps on a daily basis throughout the war.

23. My task and the task of the sector I managed was to provide all material and technical conditions for the implementation of combat activities and sustenance of life in the territory.

24. I must note that the Army shared the fate of the population, and that the Corps Command occasionally, and one can say almost regularly, informed and respected the opinion of the civilian authorities in the cases of evaluating the military and political situation and defence of the territory. In terms of government bodies, only the executive authorities at municipal level were functioning, and they were a pillar in the supply of the army, and especially their local units.

THE MANJAČA CAMP FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

25. On 26 May 1992, at the regular briefing at 07:15 hrs in the 1st Krajina Corps Command, within the scope of other tasks (regarding the problem of prisoners of war and operative records regarding them, the situation in the zone of responsibility, the handover of the territory of Western Slavonia to the UN Protection Forces, and the provision of 500 sets of personal equipment, 3 sets of field kitchen trailers for the Nepalese Battalion, 3 sets of field kitchen trailers for the Zone Territorial Defence Staff of Western Slavonia, and other issues), we were tasked with forming a camp for prisoners of war (LRZ) at Manjača, and Colonel Vaso Tepšić, the then Assistant Commander for Logistics (PKPo) of the 1st Krajina Corps, was designated as the leader of the task.

26. As part of the above tasks, I, as the Chief of Quartermaster Service and Dr Branko Dikić, the Chief of Medical Service (NSnSI), were tasked to perform the following day (27 May), together with the PKPo, the inspection of the units at Manjača and see what the situation was, and to recommend solutions to the issues regarding the establishing of the LRZ. We submitted reports through the regular chain of reporting, and besides this, the said matter was regulated by the official orders within the competence of the VRS Main Staff, which additionally issued a detailed Instruction on the treatment of these persons based on the Rules of international humanitarian law, and issued detailed tasks to the leaders of these tasks in the organs of the 1st Krajina Corps.

27. My responsibility concerned the accommodation, provision of food, bath and change of clothes. All the bodies of my Command made provisions and implemented this task as requested, based on the situation and capacities of the accommodation premises, the situation and possibilities regarding the provision of food items, personal hygiene items, washing and change of clothes, and based on the need for medical attention and provision of necessary medicines.

28. The unit that was tasked with establishing and securing the functioning of the LRZ submitted the number of persons through the regular chain to my personnel in charge of food supply in the Kozara Barracks, and they performed the calculation and delivery of all food items and other necessities in the same manner as they did to all other users of the food scheme.

29. On 6 June 1992, I resolved eight specific issues regarding the provision of 2 sets of field kitchen trailers and accompanying equipment for the preparation of meals.

30. The preparation and distribution of meals was organised by the prisoners of war themselves.

31. At the same time, I arranged for the necessary amount of blankets from the Armoured and Mechanised Units School Centre (ŠCOMJ) for their needs, and the engagement of the ABHO */Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence/* for hygienic needs of all the VRS members and prisoners of war at Manjača. Baths were taken as needed and as requested. Sometime later, based on the identified shortcomings and observations from the LRZ, plastic barrels with the capacity of 100-200 litres were provided for storing water next to the outhouses.

32. There were several camps for prisoners of war that were organised by our units.

CONTROLLING THE SITUATION AT MANJAČA AND THE VISITS BY THE ICRC

33. The work and the organisation of the said tasks were covered by regular controls and visits by professional leaders, and thus everything was done within the limits of our organisational and particularly material capabilities at that time.

34. Concurrently with our representatives, our inspections of the situation were monitored almost regularly, and at request, by representatives of the International Red Cross, who collected the lists of detained persons; there were also members of the *Merhamet* and *Caritas* humanitarian organisations.

35. Likewise, they were allowed to come and visit the areas at their request and when they expressed the need to do so.

36. I am not aware of any such requests being denied.

37. Moreover, we clearly informed everyone that the conditions we provided were the maximum that we could do, and that anything that can be additionally arranged through humanitarian organisations was allowed, and they put it in practice. Representatives of humanitarian societies (HD) obtained and brought eating utensils, dishes for distribution of meals, dishwashing detergents and personal hygiene items, as well as medicines, all with the aim of ensuring a higher standard of life in the camp and securing the right to humane living conditions during the stay of these persons in the camp.

38. On several occasions I personally visited the prisoners in the company of humanitarian workers who were bringing the said items; we did not hide anything, and the work and implementation of these tasks were transparent, responsible and professional, as was the case with the exchange, which was conducted on the "all for all" basis until the final closure of the LRZ in the presence of the ICRC in November 1992.

FALSE STATEMENTS ABOUT VICTIMS AT MANJAČA

39. Reading subsequent reports concerning these issues, I found out some statements, even by the persons who visited the LRZ at Manjača in my company, which contained misrepresentations about the situation in the LRZ, about the alleged inhumane treatment, abuse, torture and even murders of prisoners. I really do not know about that and I am not aware of any intention to do such things.

40. I categorically state that such information is not even close to the truth; I am referring to the information falling under the category "I know for certain", "I heard", "I was told", "I was provided this information by people of confidence", etc., that 40 prisoners were killed at Manjača; that 15 people disappeared from the city prison, having been seen alive in the

prison only 7 or 8 days before, and that they were later found dead in the riverbed of the nearby Crkvena River, etc. Whoever claims such things is not telling the truth.

41. I would not like to be misunderstood, but in the context of the general madness of the war that raged in these areas I would like to state that in the territory controlled by the opposing side there existed five hundred and thirty-six (536) camps for prisoners of war (of which as many as 126 were in the city of Sarajevo only), in which Serbs were detained, tortured and an unidentified number of them were murdered.

THE "MALI NOVI LOGOR" BARRACKS

42. There was a barracks called "Mali Novi Logor" /*Small New Camp*/ in Banja Luka, where the military investigative prison (VIZ) was situated under the jurisdiction of the Military Court, and in which detainees were kept only during the inquiry into criminal offences for which they were apprehended. Those were mostly military personnel (soldiers, conscripts and officers).

43. This detention facility was not a typical prison, but just because it was located in the barracks named *Novi Mali Logor* we had difficulties and problems proving that it was not a camp of any regular type, let alone a camp for prisoners of war.

44. It is for this reason that we would bring representatives of the ICRC and international humanitarian representatives to show them the current situation at the facility.

45. We opened and showed them each and every room, even the storage room for brooms and brushes used for cleaning the premises, etc.

THE RECEPTION OF CROAT POPULATION FROM CENTRAL BOSNIA

46. I remember that in June 1993, at the Vlašić plateau in the zone of the 1st Krajina Corps, the reception and accommodation of Croat population and their combat formations was organised; they were running from the Muslim forces in Central Bosnia. The reception was implemented pursuant to an order of the superior command. We provided water, food and medical aid for them. They felt safe and protected in our territory.

47. My task at that time was to organise the reception of personnel and their materiel. My subordinate officer, the Chief of Traffic Service Colonel Dragomir Vejnović, was designated to go to Vlašić.

48. There were many women, children and the elderly; there were certainly several thousand of them. There were even cases where women were in labour. After their arrival and according to their wishes, the population was transported towards their destinations of choice.

49. Members of the HVO agreed to surrender their weapons and to be temporarily accommodated at Manjača. Prior to that they voluntarily turned in their personal weapons and the list of personnel. I would like to note that they did not have the status of war prisoners, nor was Manjača at that time functioning as a camp for prisoners of war. There were no incidents whatsoever during the implementation of these tasks. They were subsequently transported from Manjača through the territory of RS /*Republika Srpska*/ to join the HVO forces.

50. I must emphasise that we carried out the reception and accommodation of the Croat population pursuant to the order of the VRS Main Staff Commander General Ratko Mladić.

SEPTEMBER 1993

51. The non-functioning of the state authorities and the failure to declare a state of war served as the bases for the rebellion of September 1993. Soldiers expressed their dissatisfaction because they felt they were not adequately valued for their participation in armed fights. They were also displeased with the situation in the society, and especially with the fact that some individuals were becoming enormously rich and profiting on the hardships of plain soldiers and the people. They pointed to the problems and flaws in the military organisation, which, objectively speaking, did exist.

52. The 1st Krajina Corps Command was not aware of any indications that the rebellion would take place, even though a day before the rebellion, on 9 September 1993, a regular quarterly briefing was held with the subordinate commanders of all the war units, at which all the elements of combat readiness were reported to the Corps Commander General Talić. I was present at the briefing in my capacity as a member of the Command and Talić's assistant.

53. A session of the National Assembly of RS was being held before the rebellion, to be suspended on the day of the rebellion. An analysis of the status and problems in the VRS was on its agenda. Later on, this 34th Session was continued on 29 September 1993, and all the Corps Commanders and the Air Force Commander were invited to attend it. Apparently, an instant reconciliation occurred on that occasion because the invitation of the commanders was

intended as a message to the people that the military and civilian authorities are unified regarding the defence matters.

54. As it turned out, the reason behind the rebellion had not been the war profiteers and injustice, but it was aimed at the officers who were then being arrested and declared war profiteers. I was also stopped in the street, disarmed and taken to the lobby of the Command Building, where I found most of my colleagues. I would like to note that General Talić was in Prnjavor at the time, and he called me and asked what was going on and who was managing all of that. I did not know at that time what was going on and I could not give him an answer. During the first day of the rebellion, President Karadžić and a number of deputies came to Prnjavor.

55. It was only later that I found out from General Živomir Ninković, the Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence (V i PVO), that it had been an organised rebellion led by deserters. On 15 September 1993, I was telephoned from Prnjavor by General Mladić himself. He asked me how I was and how the others were, and then he said: "Do not be afraid, the entire situation is managed by the main chief himself..." I knew what he was talking about, because I had already received an order establishing the Staff of the "Action Banja Luka-93", with its seat in Prnjavor. The Staff was managed by the Supreme Commander, and the composition of the Staff was also listed therein. I heard on Radio Banja Luka that General Mladić had disarmed and dispersed the rebels at Klačnice while he was on his way to Banja Luka.

56. General Mladić soon arrived in Banja Luka and I saw him, from the window of my office, speaking to the crew of a tank that had been placed at the crossroads in front of the Crops Command. The General requested that all the soldiers go back to the barracks at once and remove the combat equipment from the street, because the people would laugh at them; he said he was going to call the formation at the barracks and issue an order for the return to the units. He emphasised that those who did not show up at formation would be considered deserters. I was also present at the negotiations to end the rebellion.

INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN BANJA LUKA

57. I have lived and worked in Banja Luka since 1970. I also lived there during the war. There was no ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population during the war.

58. There were a considerable number of non-Serb officers in my military organ, as well as in my apartment building in which the ethnic composition did not change.

DESTRUCTION OF SACRED SITES

59. I categorically state that the Corps Command never ordered destruction of religious facilities in Banja Luka, or elsewhere in its zone of responsibility. I also remember that we issued a written order prohibiting destruction of religious sites. Such destructions did occur, and they were probably carried out by individuals and groups who were not under the command of the Corps. I know that that it was discussed that all the explosions in Banja Luka had been carried out in such an unprofessional manner that it was absolutely certain that the explosives had not been placed by individuals who dealt with explosives professionally.

60. I remember that after the destruction of the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, the representatives of civilian government requested professional assistance from the Corps Command in crushing some large stone blocks that the utility service was unable to remove. We did not grant their request because they had not furnished us with a written request.

61. I would like to emphasise that I personally had a very good and fair relationship with the Bishop of Banja Luka Mr Komarica and the director of *Caritas* in the activities concerning the care and provisions for the population in the territory, regardless of the ethnicity of the population, and in humanitarian activities, such as blood donations for the wounded etc.

ENCOUNTERS WITH GENERAL MLADIĆ

62. I met General Mladić in Banja Luka, at the time of the National Assembly Session at which the VRS was founded and he was appointed the VRS Main Staff Commander. He was very cordial, direct, and appeared as a very confident person. He gave me a sense of security. All that I had heard and pictured about him earlier was proven right about his personality when I was in an official visit to the Knin Corps.

63. Later on, we met on several occasions in the course of our duties in the VRS. He proved himself an extraordinary leader who, lending a sense of confidence to what we did, and he never disappointed me personally. I had limitless trust in him, and I learned from our relationship that he respected me too. As a person, he is exceptionally honest, energetic, determined and righteous. I was with him in Sanski Most before his departure to the

Assembly Session, when he read his entire speech for the Assembly and asked me and other officers present for our opinion. He allowed my attendance as the only colonel at the meeting with the generals in Banja Luka, when his dismissal was attempted the first time. For me, it was a gesture of exceptional respect and trust.

OSMAN SELAK

64. In 1998 there were a technical base and a quartermaster base in Banja Luka. The Commander of the Technical Base was Colonel Selak, and the Commander of the Quartermaster Base was Colonel Radoslav Ćendić. That year, the two bases were joined to form the 993rd Logistics Base, whose Commander became Colonel Osman Selak, and Colonel Radoslav Ćendić was appointed his deputy. After this Base was established, Selak would go to Belgrade to brief General Vladan Šljivić, the then Commander of the Logistics of the JNA and Selak's superior.

65. In May 1992, when the VRS was established, all the units were furnished with a memorandum of the Main Staff, which stated that the officers were to decide whether they would like to stay in BiH and in the VRS, or go to the FRY and continue their military service there. Selak chose to stay and he was appointed Commander of the 14th Logistics Base (14. PoB), which essentially inherited the structure and facilities of the former 993rd Logistics Base. He remained in that position until 10 July 1992, when he handed the duty over to Colonel Škondrić due to his retirement.

66. As the Commander of the Base, he was obliged to attend the weekly meetings of the Corps Commander's Collegium in order to deal with the issues of logistics. Hence, he was never an assistant commander for logistics, but he attended those meetings in his capacity of the Commander of the Base. The Assistant Commander for Logistics was Colonel TEPŠIĆ until he perished, and after him I took over that duty.

67. Therefore, Selak's statement that the Corps Commander called his assistants half an hour earlier so that he could not hear what they were talking about, does not hold up.

68. It is likely that the Commander attended to all the other matters with his assistants, save for the matters of logistics which he discussed with Selak, i.e. the Commander could discuss these issues with Selak at any time the Commander found convenient.

69. Selak was not a member of either the inner or the outer circle of the Corps Command because the Base was outside the formation structure of the 1st Krajina Corps.

70. The 14th Logistics Base was subordinated to the logistics organ of the VRS Main Staff. His deputy, Radoslav Ćendić, also told me that no one pressured Selak to retire.

71. Selak was concurrently appointed the JNA representative for contacts with the UNPROFOR, which again shows that he was trusted. He was appointed to this position by the SSNO */Federal Secretariat of National Defence/*. However, I also know that Selak would go to Jajce and take there the information about the situation in the JNA. There was a stronger SDA */Party of Democratic Action/* base there than in Banja Luka. This was told to me by Colonel Vaso Tepšić on one occasion.

WITNESS CONFIRMATION

I have read this statement comprising 15 pages, and it contains all that I said to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this statement voluntarily, and I am aware that it can be used in the proceedings before the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, and that I may be called to testify publicly before the Tribunal.

Signature: _____ /signature/ _____

Date: _____ 25 June 2014 _____

**MEĐUNARODNI SUD ZA KRIVIČNO GONJENJE OSOBA ODGOVORNIH ZA
TEŠKA KRŠENJA MEĐUNARODNOG PRAVA NA TERITORIJI BIVŠE
JUGOSLAVIJE OD 1991**

IZJAVA SVEDOKA

PODACI O SVEDOKU:

Prezime: AMIDŽIĆ

Ime: BOŠKO

Ime oca: RISTO

Datum rođenja: 25.11.1945.


Nacionalnost: Srbin

Datum(i) razgovora: 22.02.2014.

Razgovor(e) vodili: Branko Lukić, Mikajlo Mitrović

Jezici korišćeni u toku razgovora: Srpski

Potpis svedoka: _____



IZJAVA SVEDOKA - AMIDŽIĆ BOŠKO

LIČNI PODACI

1. Zovem se Amidžić Boško, sin Riste, rođen 25.11.1945. g. u selu Veliko Blaško, opština Laktaši. Osnovnu školu sam završio u Laktašima, srednju ekonomsku završio sam u Banja Luci, a Vojnoekonomsku akademiju sam završio 1970.g. 1981. g. sam otišao u Komandno-štabnu Akademiju.

2. U Banjaluci počinjem da radim kao komandir intendantskog voda 1970. g. u Centru oklopno-mehanizovanih jedinica. 1972. g. počinjem da radim kao Načelnik intendantske službe 329. oklopne brigade koja je bila stacionirana u kasarni Kozara. Nakon toga sam bio na raznim dužnostima. 1979. godine sam došao kao načelnik intendantske službe u Komandi 5. Divizije, sa sedištem u Banja Luci. Ova divizija je kasnije preformirana u 5. Korpus gde sam nastavio da vršim dužnost načelnika intendantske službe. Formiranjem VRS ulazim u sastav 1. Krajiškog Korpusa kao načelnik intendantske službe. Na dužnost pomoćnika komandanta za pozadinu sam postavljen 14.02.1993.g, a penzionisan sam po ličnom zahtevu 31.07.1997. g.

UČEŠĆE JEDINICA 5. (Banjalučkog) Korpusa U RATU U HRVATSKOJ

3. Delovi 5. Korpusa su bili razmešteni u Zapadnoj Slavoniji, koja je bila u zoni odgovornosti Korpusa. Ja sam dolazio na teren i obilazio jedinice. U Zapadnu Slavoniju su prvo otišli delovi 329. oklopne brigade, delovi 16. mtbr, delovi 343. motorizovane brigade(mtbr), delovi 2. Krajiške brigade i delovi 122 pešadijske brigade. Delovi ovih brigada su upućeni u Zapadnu Slavoniju da bi razdvojili već zaraćene strane i narode. Tu mislim na Srbe i Hrvate.

4. Kada sam došao u Okučane, zatekao sam zaustavljene vojne transporte JNA, koji su se kretali prema Srbiji iz Slovenije. Milan Čeleketić, potpukovnik, došao je iz Bjelovara te prilike da bi oslobodio prolaz tih transporta kroz Slavoniju i dalje. Transporti su išli vozom.

Amidžić Boško
△

5. Milan Čeleketić se više nije mogao vratiti u Bjelovar zbog toga što je presečena komunikacija prema Bjelovaru.

6. Sećam se da su tada meštani 72 srpska sela morali da napusti prostore sa Papuka, na pravcu Našice - Virovitica.

7. Srbi nisu imali poverenja u nas, u pripadnike i jedinice JNA, koja je još bila multinacionalnog sastava. Napravili smo tampon zone između Srba i Hrvata u cilju njihovog razdvajanja. Mi nismo dali da bilo ko prođe preko našeg prostora ako je naoružan. Mi nismo puštali naoružane meštane ako nisu bili u jedinici. Zato su bili nepoverljivi. Mi smo pokušali od njih da formiramo jedinicu. Tražili bi oružje, mi to nismo dali. Oružje bi dobili samo ako se uključe u JNA. Međutim, kada dođemo da ih regrutujemo ne pojavi se niko. Zato nismo ni delili oružje.

8.- Jedinice su se kasnije dislocirale iz Zapadne Slavonije prema planu koji je utvrđen ugovorom između JNA i UNPROFOR-a, koji je od JNA preuzeo ulogu zaštite naroda u tampon zonama.

9. Znam da sam se lečio dve sedmice na VMA u proleće 1992, i u tom periodu se deo 5. Korpus dislocirao iz Zapadne Slavonije na prostor Krajine.

PRVI KRAJIŠKI KORPUS

10. Osnovno komandno mesto je bilo u Banja Luci. Uži deo komande, kao što su komandant, načelnik štaba, referent iz operativnog odeljenja, načelnik veze, su bili u Prnjavoru, gde je formirano istureno komandno mesto. Ja sam ostao na osnovnom komandnom mestu u Banja Luci i bio odgovoran za njegovo funkcionisanje. Bio sam određen za komandanta na osnovnom komandnom mestu.

11. 1. KK je bio najveća jedinica operativno-strategijskog nivoa, imao je i do 48 jedinica ranga puka-brigade, u zoni odgovornosti je imao 30 od ukupno 60 opština u Republici Srpskoj,

Antun Čauko
△

1159 naseljenih mesta, što je 50% Republike Srpske. Zona odgovornosti je bila na površini od 16.650 kvadratnih kilometara. Ukupna površina BiH je 51.242. kvadratna kilometra, pa je Republika Srpska sa svojom površinom od 34.650 kvadratnih kilometara, činila u to vreme (1993.g) 68.% površine BiH.

ZNAČAJ LOGISTIKE

12. Gotovost oružja i oruđa bilo za koju odluku komandanta ne može se doneti ako logistika prethodno nije obezbedila uslove za uspešnu realizaciju odluke. Ne može se doneti gotovost početka akcije ili operacije, bez potvrde da to logistika može uspešno obezbediti. Pored navedenog moram istaći da je pozadinsko obezbeđenje (logistika) podrazumeva daleko šire oblasti, kao što su intendantsko obezbeđenje (hranu, odeću, obuću, ličnu i kolektivnu higijenu, int.tehniku id r.) saobraćajno, sanitetsko, veterinarsko, građevinsko i dr.

13. U uslovima narušene proizvodne strukture, koja nije ni približno obezbeđivala popunu redovnih potreba vojske i stanovništva, često sam morao da improvizujem smanjenjem normi utroška, da regulišem prioritete i dr.

14. Ja sam 05.03.1993. godine prisustvovao analizi borbene gotovosti Vojske Republike Srpske za 1992. g. Tom prilikom je između ostalog navedeno da je Vojska po svim elementima izvršila svoj zadatak i da nam predstoje odlučni koraci u finalizaciji odbrane otadžbine, koje je jedino moguće u apsolutnom jedinstvu naroda i vojske. Tada je ocenjivan svaki element borbrne gotovosti, a posebno pozadinsko obezbeđenje.

15. Tada je konstatovano da je dosadašnji tok borbe vođen u krajnjoj oskudici novčanih i materijalnih sredstava, energenata, uz vrlo slab ili neznan rad vlastitih proizvodno-uslužnih kapaciteta (od 3-7%), te vrlo tankih materijalnih rezervina svim nivoima. Data je opšta ocena da je to bila praktična borba za egzistenciju. Već tada, pa sve do kraja rata, bili smo prinuđeni da kupujemo municiju i ostala sredstva potrebna za vođenje rata.

Amirko Gouko

16. Struktura pozadinskog obezbeđenja i zadaci koje sam samo delimično naveo, ukazuju na složenost borbenog sistema sa kojim sam ja, po ocenama mog komandanta i Glavnog Štaba, uspešno rukovodio. Obezbeđivao sam uslove za uspešnu realizaciju njihovih odluka u borbi.

17. Rukovodio sam sa velikim brojem ljudi u tom sistemu, a samo na nivou komande korpusa, u mom sektoru pozadine, bilo mi je neposredno podčinjeno oko 30-34 ljudi različitih specijalnosti i činova. Tu nisam ubrojao strukturu i sastav izvršnih pozadinskih jedinica iz organskog sastava korpusa.

BORBE ZA OTVARANJE KORIDORA-„PUTA ŽIVOTA”

18. Raspadom države je došlo do raspada pozadinskog sistema bivše JNA, zavisno od uticaja i snage tada paravojnih struktura secesionističkih republika. Tada se i južno od Save registruju vrlo aktivna dejstva muslimanskih paravojnih i snaga HVO. Usled tih dejstava bio je prekinut saobraćaj na pravcu B.Luka-Prnjavor-Bijeljina (snage HVO od Bos.Broda došle su do predgrađa Dobja, do sela Kotorско, a muslimanske snage su sa južne strane došle do Putnikovog brda i ušća reke Usore u reku Bosnu). Praktično ostalo je vazdušne linije 6-8 km do praktične podele i definitivnog rasecanja Republike Srpske na dva dela.

19. Istovremeno je bio prekinut PTT saobraćaj, Platni promet, ali je još u funkciji avio linija Banja Luka-Beograd, kao jedina ali opterećena i vrlo nesigurna. Svako snabdevanje je bilo nemoguće odnosno prekinuto. Praktično počinje izolacija ovog prostora u svakom smislu. U takvim okolnostima radimo sa samo lokalnim kapacitetima, ali i pripremama za rad u samoj oskudici. Nije bilo dovoljno hrane, lekova, energenata ni za vojsku, ni za stanovništvo. Zbog nemogućnosti dobijanja kiseonika dolazi do smrti 12 beba u Banjalučkoj bolnici, kao i ugroženosti hemodijaliznih i ostalih kritičnih pacijenata.

20. Takva situacija je dovela do sve određenije odluke vojnog i civilnog rukovodstva da se ide na vojničko otvaranje “Putu Života” prema reci Drini, prema istočnom delu Republike Srpske i SRJ. Odluka za operaciju”Koridor-92” doneta je 12.juna 1992.g.

Amunt Comko
△

21. Operacija je imala nekoliko etapa, a otvaranje koridora je izvršeno 26. juna u okviru prve etape.
22. Posle otvaranja koridora nastavljena su borbena dejstva, koje je 1. KK vodio svakodnevno do kraja rata.
23. Moj zadatak i zadatak sektora sa kojim sam rukovodio je bio obezbeđenje svih materijalno tehničkih uslova za izvršenje borbenih dejstava i života u prostoru.
24. Moram da iznesem da je Vojska delila sudbinu stanovništva, te da je komanda korpusa povremeno, a skoro i redovno informisala i uvažavala mišljenje civilnih organa vlasti u slučajevima procene vojno-političke situacije i procene odbrane prostora. Od državnih organa vlasti jedino su funkcionisali izvršni organi vlasti u opštinama, koji su i bili oslonac u snabdevanju vojske, posebno svojih, lokalnih jedinica.

LOGOR RATNIH ZAROBLJENIKA MANJACĀ

25. Dana 26.05.1992. godine na redovnom informisanju u 07,15 casova u Komandi 1. KK u sklopu ostalih zadataka, (o problemu zarobljenih lica sa njihovom operativnom evidencijom, o stanju na teritoriji odgovornosti, predaji teritorije Z. Slavonija zastitnim snagama UN i obezbjedjenja zahtjeva za 500 kompleta licne opreme, 3 kompleta kuhinja auto-prikolica za bataljon iz Nepala, 3 kompleta kuhinje auto-prikolica za Zonski ŠTO Zapadna Slavonija, drugih problema) dobili smo zadatak da se formira logor ratnih zarobljenika (LRZ) na Manjaci i za taj zadatak je odredjen nosioc pukovnik Tepsic Vaso, tada Pomoćnik komandanta za pozadinu (PKPo) 1. KK.
26. U sklopu ovih zadataka dobili smo zaduzenje ja, kao načelnik intendantske službe, i načelnik sanitetske službe (NSnSI) dr. Branko Dikic da zajedno sa PKPo sutradan (27.05.) izvrsimo kontrolu jedinica na Manjaci sagledamo stanje, te predlozimo resenja za pitanja o formiranju LRZ. Izvestaje smo dostavili redovnom linijom informisanja, a osim toga ovo pitanje je regulisano zvanicnim naredjenjima iz nadleznosti GŠ VRS, koji je uz sve, propisao i detaljno

Amirah Tepsic
△

Uputstvo za postupak sa tim licima na osnovu Pravila medjunarodnog ratnog prava, kao i detaljne zadatke po nosiocima ovih poslova po organima u 1. KK.

27. Moja nadležnost je bila iz domene smjestaja, obezbjedjenja ishrane, kupanja i presvlacenja. Svi organi moje k-de su i ovaj zadatak obezbjedili i izvorsavali na nivou zahteva, stanja I mogucnosti prostora za smjestaj, stanja i mogucnosti obezbjedjenja artikala hrane, sredstava za licnu higijenu, kupanje i presvlacenje, te potrebe lekarskih pregleda i obezbjedjenje nužnih lijekova.

28. Jedinica koja je odredjena za formiranje i obezbjedjenje funkcije LRZ je dostavljala brojno stanje redovnim putem mojim nosiocima ishrane u kasarni."Kozara", a ovi su vrsili obracun i dotur svih artikala hrane i drugih potreba kao I svim drugim korisnicima na šemi ishrane.

29. Dana 06.06.1992.g. rijesavam osam konkretnih pitanja obezbjedjenja 2 kompleta kuhinja auto-prikolica za kuvanje hrane sa pratećom opremom.

30. Organizacija pripremanja i podjele hrane je regulisana u režiji samih zarobljenika.

31. Istovremeno sam riješio potrebnu kolicinu ćebadi iz Školskog Centra OMJ(ŠCOMJ) za njihove potrebe, kao i angazovanje čete ABHO za kupanje svih vojnika VRS i ratnih zarobljenika (RZ) na Manjaci. Kupanje je bilo prema potrebi i po zahtjevima. Nesto kasnije na osnovu uocenih nedostataka i primjedbi iz LRZ obezbjedjena su i PVC burad od 100 – 200 litara za vodu uz poljske nužnike.

32. U organizaciji nasih jedinica nije bilo vise Logora Ratnih Zarobljenika.

August Bouba

KONTROLA STANJA NA MANJAČI I OBILAZAK OD STRANE MKCK

33. Rad i organizacija ovih zadataka bila je pokrivena redovnim kontrolama i obilascima stručnih nosioca, čime je činjeno sve što je bilo u granicama naših organizacionih, a posebno materijalnih mogućnosti tog vremena.

34. Istovremeno sa našim predstavnicima skoro redovno, a i prema zahtjevu našu inspekciju ovog stanja su pratili predstavnici međunarodnog crvenog krsta, koji su preuzimali spiskove zarobljenih lica, kao i članovi humanitarnih društava "Merhamet" i "Karitas".

35. Isto tako bio je dozvoljen odlazak i obilazak tih prostora prema njihovom zahtjevu i njihovoj ukazanoj potrebi.

36. Nije mi poznato da je ostao neodobren takav njihov zahtjev.

37. Svima smo takodje jasno dali do znanja da je to i takvi uslovi naš maksimum i objasnili da sve što još može da se obezbjedi linijom humanitarnih organizacija dozvoljeno je i oni su to praktikovali. Predstavnici humanitarnih društava (HD) su obezbjedili i doneli pribor za jelo, posudje za podjelu hrane, sredstva za pranje sudja i licnu higijenu, kao i lijekove, sve sa ciljem obezbjedjenja višeg nivoa standarda zivota u logoru te, obezbedjenja prava na humani zivot za vrijeme boravka u logoru tih lica.

38. Nekoliko puta sam i lično bio u obilaska zarobljenika kada su sa mnom išli humanitarni radnici sa svojim ponudama, ništa nismo krili, a rad i realizacija ovih zadataka je bila transparentna, odgovorna i profesionalna, kao i sama razmjena po principima "svi za sve" sve do konačnog zatvaranja tog LRZ uz prisustvo MKCK novembra 1992. g.

Амант Беоки

LAŽNE IZJAVE O ŽRTVAMA NA MANJAČI

39. Čitajući kasnije izvjestaje u vezi sa ovom problematikom pronašao sam izjave i onih koji su bili u obilascima LRZ na Manjači i sa mnom, koji su prenosili i drugačije informacije o stanju u tom LRZ, o navodnom nehumanom odnosu, maltretiranju, mucenju pa i ubistvima zarobljenika. Ja to zaista ne znam i nije mi poznato da je bilo namjere da se to čini.

40. Odgovorno tvrdim da takve informacije nisu ni blizu istini a one iz domena "pouzdana znam", "čuo sam", "rečeno mi je", "došao sam do podataka od poverljivih ljudi isl." da je ubijeno 40 zarobljenika na Manjaci, da je nestalo 15 lica iz graskog zatvora, koji su vidjeni samo 7-8 dana ranije živi u zatvoru a kasnije nadjeni mrtvi u koritu obližnje rijeke Crkvene i sl. Ko god ovo tvrdi ne govori istinu.

41. Da ne budem pogrešno shvacen, u kontekstu opšteg ludila ovih prostora koji je imao rat, na isti način naveo bih da je na teritoriji pod kontrolom protivne strane postojalo 536 (petstotridesetšest) Logora Ratnih Zaroblenika (od toga 126 Logora Ratnih Zarobljenika, samo u gradu Sarajevo) u kojima su bili zatvarani, mučeni i neutvrđen broj Likvidiranih Srba.

KASARNA „MALI NOVI LOGOR”

42. Postojala je kasarna koja se zvala „ Mali Novi Logor” u Banja Luci gdje je bio vojno-istražni zatvor (VIZ) pod ingerencijom Vojnog suda u kojem su držali pritvorenike i to samo za vrijeme ispitivanja u vezi sa krivičnim djelima za koja su privodjeni. To su uglavnom bila vojna lica (vojnici, v/o i starjesine).

43. Ovaj pritvor nije bio klasicni zatvor, ali samo zato sto se nalazio u kasarni koja nosi naziv „Novi Mali Logor”, imali smo teskoca i problema da to i dokazemo da se ne radi o nikakvom logoru klasicnog tipa a posebno ne o LRZ.

August Boučko

44. Zbog toga smo na lice mjesta vodili predstavnike MKCK i međunarodne humanitarne predstavnike da im na licu mjesta pokazemo trenutno stanje u tom objektu.

45. Otvorili smo i pokazali sve prostorije čak i prostoriju za pribor sa cetkama, metlama za održavanje kolektivne higijene prostora i dr.

PRIHVAT HRVATSKOG STANOVNIŠTVA IZ SREDNJE BOSNE

46. Sećam se da je juna 1993. godine u zonu I.KK, na platou Vlašić izvršen prihvati zbrinjavanje hrvatskog stanovništva i njihovih borbenih sastava, koji su bežali od muslimanskih snaga u Srednjoj Bosni. Prihvati je izvršen na osnovu naređenja pretpostavljene komande. Obezbedili smo im vodu, hranu, sanitetsko zbrinjavanje. Osećali su se sigurno i zaštićeno na našoj teritoriji.

47. Tada sam ja dobio zadatak da organizujem prihvat ljudstva i materijalnih sredstava. Moj potčinjeni, načelnik saobraćajne službe pukovnik Vejnović Dragomir je bio određen da ode na Vlašić.

48. Bilo je puno žena, dece i staraca, sigurno nekoliko hiljada njih. Bilo je i slučajeva da su se i žene tada porađale. Po njihovom izlasku i po njihovim željama, a na bazi transportnih sredstava, stanovništvo je bilo upućeno ka željenim odredištima.

49. Pripadnici HVO pristali su da predaju naoružanje i budu privremeno upućeni na Manjaču. Pre toga su dobrovoljno predali lično naoružanje sa spiskom lica. Napominjem da oni nisu imali status ratnih zarobljenika, vnti je tada Manjača aktivirana kao LRZ. U toku izvršenja ovih zadataka nije bilo ni jednog incidenta. Sa Manjače su kasnije odveženi u sastav HVO preko teritorije RS.

50. Moram da naglasim da smo postupali po naređenju Komandanta GŠ VRS, generala Ratka Mladića, da se izvrši prihvat i zbrinjavanje hrvatskog stanovništva.

Argument Bosko

SEPTEMBAR 1993. g.

51. Posledica nefunkcionisanja državne vlasti i neproglašavanje ratnog stanja, bila je osnova za pobunu septembra 1993. g. Vojnici su tada izrazili nezadovoljstvo upravo smatrajući da nisu adekvatno vrednovani za svoje učešće u borbama. Takođe su bili nezadovoljni stanjem u društvu, naročito činjenicom da su se neki enormno bogatili i profitirali na mucu običnih boraca i naroda. Iznosili su probleme i propuste u vojnoj organizaciji, kojih je objektivno bilo.

52. Komanda 1. KK nije imala indicija da će do pobune doći, iako je dan pre pobune, 09.09.1993. g. održano redovno tromesečno referisanje potčinjenih komandanata svih ratnih jedinica po svim elementima borbene gotovosti komandantu korpusa gen. Taliću. Ja sam kao organ komande i kao Talićev pomoćnik prisustvovao tom referisanju.

53. Pre pobune održavala se Sednica Narodne Skupštine RS, koja je prekinula sa radom na dan pobune. Na dnevnom redu je bilo pitanje razmatranja stanja i problema u VRS. Kasnije je nastavak te 34. Sednice bio održan 29. septembra 1993. na kojoj su bili pozvani svi komandanti korpusa i komandant vazduhoplovstva. Tada je verovatno došlo do trenutnog izmirenja, jer se pozivanjem komandanata htelo narodu reći da su vojne i civilne vlasti jedinstvene po pitanju odbrane.

54. Suština pobune nisu bili ratni profiteri i nepravda, već se ispostavilo da je bila usmerena na oficire, koje su tada hapsili i proglašavali ratnim profiterima. I mene su na ulici presreli, razoružali i sproveli u hol zgrade komande gde sam našao većinu svojih kolega. Napominjem da je u to vreme general Talić bio u Prnjavoru, te da me je zvao i pitao šta se dešava i ko sa tim rukovodi. Nisam tada znao o čemu se radi i nisam mogao da mu odgovorim. Tada sam prvi put čuo i za Krizni štab akcije koji je tada bio formiran. U toku prvog dana pobune u Prnjavor je stigao i predsednik Karadžić i jedan deo poslanika.

55. Ja sam tek kasnije od generala Živomira Ninkovića, komandanta Vazduhoplovstva i Protiv Vazdušne Odbrane (V i PVO) saznao prvi put da je u pitanju organizovana vojna pobuna,

Stanimir Gouk

koju su vodili dezerteri. 15. septembra 1993. g. iz Prnjavora me je nazvao lično general Mladić. Pitao me je kako sam i kako su ostali, a zatim rekao: „...Nemoj da se plašiš kompletnom situacijom rukovodi lično glavni šef...” Znao sam o čemu priča, jer sam već bio dobio naredbu, kojom se formira Štab „Akcija Banja Luka-93”, sa sedištem u Prnjavoru. Tim štabom je rukovodio Vrhovni komandant, a bio je naveden i sastav tog štaba. Preko radio Banja Luke sam čuo da je general Mladić u dolasku prema Banjaluci, u Klašnicama, razoružao i rasterao pobunjenike.

56. General Mladić je ubrzo stigao u Banjaluku i ja sam sa prozora moje kancelarije video kako već razgovara sa vojnicima iz posade tenka koji je bio postavljen na raskrsnici ispred komande korpusa. General je tražio da svi vojnici do jednoga odmah odu u kasarnu, da sklone borbenu tehniku sa ulice, da im se narod ne bi smejao, a u kasarni će izvršiti smotru stroja i izdati naređenje za povratak u jedinice. Naglasio je da će one koji ne budu u stroju, smatrati dezerterima. Ja sam bio prisutan i na pregovorima za okončanje pobune.

MEĐUNACIONALNI ODNOSI U BANJA LUCI

57. Ja od 1970.g. živim i radim u Banjaluci. U njoj sam živio i u vreme rata. U vreme rata nije bilo etničkog čišćenja nesrpskog stanovništva.

58. U mom organu je bilo dosta starešina nesrpske nacionalnosti, kao i u mojoj stambenoj zgradi gde se nacionalni sastav nije menjao.

RUŠENJE VERSKIH OBJEKATA

59. Odgovorno tvrdim da komanda korpusa nikada nije naredila rušenje verskih objekata u Banjaluci, niti u zoni svoje odgovornosti. Imam sećanje da smo i pismeno naredili zabranu rušenja verskih objekata. Ta rušenja su bila i verovatno su ih izvodili pojedinci i grupe koje nisu bile pod kontrolom korpusa. Znam da se pričalo da su sve eksplozije u Banja Luci izvedene tako nestručno da je bilo apsolutno sigurno da to nisu postavili ljudi koji rade sa eksplozivom.

Amurat Bozovic
△

60. Sećam se da su nakon rušenja Ferhadije u Banjaluci, predstavnici civilne vlasti, od komande korpusa tražili stručnu pomoć u razbijanju velikih kamenih blokova, koje komunalna služba nije mogla da ukloni. Nismo im udovoljili, jer nam nisu dostavili pisani zahtev.

61. Želim da istaknem da sam lično imao veoma dobre i korektne odnose sa biskupom banjalučkim Komaricom i direktorom "Karitasa" u poslovima zbrinjavanja i obezbeđenja stanovništva u prostoru, bilo da se radi o srpskom ili nesrpskom stanovništvu, humanitarnim oblicima rada, dobrovoljnog davanja krvi za ranjenike i sl.

SUSRETI SA GENERALOM MLADIĆEM

62. Generala Mladića sam upoznao u Banjaluci, kada je održana Sednica Narodne skupštine na kojoj je osnovana VRS, a on imenovan za komandanta GŠ VRS. Bio je vrlo srdačan, neposredan, te je delovao vrlo pouzdano. Ulivao mi je osećaj sigurnosti. Sve ono što sam ja o njemu ranije čuo, kada sam bio u službenoj poseti kninskom korpusu, poklapalo se sa likom koga sam zamišljao.

63. Kasnije kroz obavljanje naših dužnosti u VRS sretali smo se u više navrata. Potvrdio mi se kao izuzetan vođa, ulivao je sigurnost u ono što smo radili i lično me nikada nije razočarao. Ja sam u njega imao neograničeno poverenje, a iz naših odnosa sam shvatio da i on mene uvažava. Kao čovek je izuzetno častan, energičan, odlučan i pravedan. Bio sam sa njim i u Sanskom Mostu, pred njegov odlazak na Skupštinu, kada mi je pročitao ceo svoj govor za tu Skupštinu i tražio moje i mišljenje ostalih starešina koji su tu bili. Dozvolio mi je prisustvo sastanku sa generalima u Banja Luci, kao jedinom pukovniku, pri prvom pokušaju njegove smene. To je za mene bio gest izuzetnog uvažavanja i poverenja.

Harunović Enako
▽

OSMAN SELAK

64. 1988.g. u Banja Luci su postojale tehnička i intendantska baza. Komandant tehničke je bio pukovnik Selak, a intendantske pukovnik Ćendić Radoslav. Te godine je izvršeno spajanje ovih baza u 993. pozadinsku bazu i za njenog komandanta je postavljen pukovnik Osman Selak, a pukovnik Ćendić Radoslav za njegovog zamenika. Nakon formiranja te baze Selak je išao u Beograd na referisanje generalu Vladanu Šljiviću, koji je tada bio komandant logistike JNA, te kome je Selak bio potčinjen.

65. U maju 1992.godine, kada je formirana VRS svim jedinicama je od strane Glavnog Štaba dostavljen dopis u kome je navedeno da se starešine opredele o tome da li žele da ostanu u BiH i u VRS ili žele da idu u SRJ i tamo nastave vojnu službu. Selak se opredelio da ostane i postavljen je za komandanta 14. Pozadinske baze (14. PoB), koja je u suštini nasledila strukturu i objekte prethodne 993. Pozadinske baze. Na toj dužnosti je bio do 10. jula 1992, kada je zbog odlaska u penziju predao dužnost pukovniku Škondriću.

66. Kao komandant baze imao je obavezu da jednom nedeljno bude prisutan na sastanku kolegija komandanta Korpusa, radi pitanja iz pozadinske problematike. Dakle, on nije nikada bio pomoćnik komandanta za pozadinu, već je sastancima prisustvovao kao komandant baze. Pomoćnik Komandanta za pozadinu je bio pukovnik TEPŠIĆ do svoje pogibije, a nakon njega sam tu dužnost preuzeo ja.

67. Prema tome ne stoji Selakova priča da je komandant korpusa svoje pomoćnike zvao pola sata ranije, kako on ne bi čuo o čemu pričaju.

68. Verovatno je komandant sa svojim pomoćnicima rešavao sva druga, osim pozadinskih pitanja, koje je rešavao sa Selakom, odnosno komandant je mogao ta pitanja sa Selakom da rešava u bilo koje vreme koje je komandantu odgovaralo.

69. Selak nije bio član užeg ili šireg dela komande korpusa, jer je baza bila van formacijskog sastava I.KK..

Osman Selak
↓

70. Ta 14. Pozadinska baza je bila potčinjena pozadinskom organu Glavnog Štaba VRS. Radoslav Ćendić, njegov zamenik mi je pričao i da Selaka niko nije terao da ide u penziju.

71. Selak je istovremeno bio i određen za predstavnika JNA pri kontaktima sa UNPROFOR-om, što opet ukazuje da se u njega imalo poverenja. Njegovo imenovanje je izvršeno od strane SSNO. Međutim, isto tako poznato mi je, da je Selak odlazio u Jajce i tamo nosio podatke o stanju u JNA. Tamo je bila jača baza SDA nego u Banja Luci. Ovo mi je jednom prilikom rekao pukovnik Vaso Tepšić.

Amir A. Ćendić

POTVRDA SVEDOKA

Pročitao sam ovu izjavu od 15 strana i ona sadrži sve što sam rekao, po svom znanju i sećanju. Izjavu sam dao dobrovoljno i svestan sam da se može upotrebiti u sudskom postupku pred Međunarodnim sudom za krivično gonjenje osoba odgovornih za teška kršenja međunarodnog prava počinjena na teritoriji bivše Jugoslavije od 1991, kao i da mogu biti pozvan da javno svedočim pred Sudom.

Potpis: *Amir A. Ćendić*

Datum: 25.06.2014. POA.

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

Case No. IT-09-92-T

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

RATKO MLADIĆ

Public

ANNEX B

AMIDZIC Bosko			
Witness Statement to be admitted pursuant Rule 92ter			
Statement	Date	65ter Number	Closed Session / Under seal
Witness Statement of AMIDZIC Bosko	25-Jun-2014	1D01712	/
Associated Exhibits wich the Defence seeks to tender pursuant to Rule 92ter			
Description	Paragraph Number	65ter Number	Doc ID (BCS/ENG)
Signed Witness Statement of AMIDZIC Bosko	/	1D01712	1D18-1286 1D18-1301