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Date: **06 August 2024**

PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I

Before: **Judge Iulia Antoanella Motoc, Presiding Judge**

Judge Reine Adélaïde Sophie Alapini-Gansou

Judge Nicolas Guillou

SITUATION IN THE STATE OF PALESTINE

Public

***Amicus Curiae* Observations by Law For Palestine Pursuant to Rule 103**

Source: **Law for Palestine**

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Law for Palestine hereby presents its observations in response to the Pre-Trial Chamber's (PTC) 'Order deciding on the United Kingdom's request to provide observations pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and setting deadlines for any other requests for leave to file amicus curiae observations' of 27 June 2024, ICC-01/18-173.

II. THE OBSERVATIONS

2. Law for Palestine submits that the Oslo Accords do not prevent the International Criminal Court (ICC) from exercising jurisdiction over Israeli nationals under investigation for crimes committed in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) since: (a) challenges to the ICC's jurisdiction should follow the issuance of arrest warrants (b) the irrelevance of the Oslo Accords for the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction over nationals of Israel, and (c) the situation of inactivity prevailing in Israel under the principle of complementarity.

(a) The Improper Exercise of Discretion at the Arrest Warrants Stage of Proceedings Undermines the Procedural Integrity of the Court's Operations

3. At the outset, it needs to be emphasised that the text of Rule 103(1) of the ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) grants the Chamber broad discretion, contingent upon whether the PTC deems it "desirable for the proper determination of the case" to permit applicants to submit observations as *amicus curiae*. The PTC, therefore, holds the authority to either allow such observations or refrain from exercising this discretion. Given the reasonable risk of undue delay due to the number of requests for leave that have been granted, amidst ongoing and escalating atrocities against victims, a restrictive approach to judicial discretion under Rule 103(1) would have been appropriate. This is particularly pertinent as the procedure in question pertains to the arrest warrants stage of proceedings. In the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Appeals Chamber held that, "[a]n initial determination by the Pre-Trial Chamber that the case is admissible is not a prerequisite for the issuance of a warrant of arrest pursuant to article 58 (1) of the Statute".[1]

[1] *Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Appeal Judgment) No ICC-01/04 (13 July 2006) [42]-[45].

4. The proper sequence of judicial determinations is essential for maintaining the procedural integrity of the Court's operations, and we submit the following four reasons to highlight the necessity for jurisdictional challenges to follow the issuance of arrest warrants.
5. First, we submit that the arrest warrants stage is designed to be a preliminary step focused on whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, not on adjudicating jurisdictional matters.
6. Second, Article 58(1) which governs the current stage of the proceedings, lists only two substantive requirements for issuing arrest warrants, which have been deemed exhaustive by the Appeals Chamber: first, the PTC must be satisfied that there "are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court" and, second, it must be satisfied that the arrest of the person appears necessary for at least one of the three reasons enumerated in Article 58(1)(b) of the Statute. According to the Appeals Chamber:

> If the two prerequisites listed in article 58(1) of the Statute are met, the opening sentence of article 58(1) of the Statute gives the Pre-Trial Chamber clear and unambiguous instructions as to what the Chamber should do: "the Pre-Trial Chamber shall […] issue a warrant of arrest". The use of the word "shall" indicates that the Pre-Trial Chamber is under an obligation to issue a warrant of arrest, provided that the prerequisites listed in article 58(1) of the Statute are met.[2]

7. Third, Article 58(1) sets a relatively low standard of proof for issuing arrest warrants and, according to a plain reading, arguably restricts the PTC's discretion to evaluating only the evidence and materials presented by the OTP in support of its application ('the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the application of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person if, having examined the application and the evidence or other information submitted by the Prosecutor, it is satisfied that…'). Where the PTC is satisfied that the substantive requirements listed in Article 58(1) have been met, then it is under an obligation to issue the relevant arrest warrant. Hence, Article 58(1) cannot be used to introduce jurisdictional challenges as a third substantive requirement for issuing an arrest warrant.
8. Fourth, the Rome Statute provides a specific mechanism, Article 19, which allows for a more thorough examination of jurisdictional issues between the affected parties and participants ensuring that such challenges are addressed in a comprehensive manner, rather

[2] *Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Appeal Judgment) No ICC-01/04 (13 July 2006) [44].

than at the preliminary stages of proceedings. Further, under Rule 59(3) of the RPE, victims and their legal representatives can make representations to the Court concerning challenges to jurisdiction. Crucially, Article 19(2) restricts challenges to the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction to those interested parties with procedural standing: an accused or person for whom a warrant of arrest or summons to appear has been issued under Article 58, a state which has jurisdiction over the case, meaning that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has done so, or a state which has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 12 of the Statute.

9. Article 19(2) does not grant any of the states, organisations, or individuals challenging the jurisdiction of the Court the right to submit such challenges. The Government of the United Kingdom (UK) and other states have instead sought to challenge the Court's jurisdiction prematurely under Rule 103(1) through *amicus curiae* submissions, thereby bypassing Article 19 of the Statute. It is, in view of this, unclear why the PTC has permitted such interventions at this stage of the proceedings. Despite reports that the UK has withdrawn its request to file an amicus curiae submission, if the PTC were to accept jurisdictional challenges at the arrest warrants stage, it would set a precedent that encourages states to use procedural tactics to delay or obstruct the Court's work.
10. Accordingly, any amicus curiae submissions in relation to the Oslo Accords should be dismissed whether submitted under Article 19 or otherwise under Rule 103 of the RPE. In any event, we submit the following arguments to outline that the Oslo Accords have no effect on the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction over nationals of Israel.

(b) The Oslo Accords do not prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction over Israeli nationals under investigation for crimes committed in the occupied Palestinian territory.

11. The ICC's jurisdiction is derived from the treaty of the Rome Statute. Article 12 of the Rome Statute, setting out the preconditions to the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction, is not dependent on bilateral agreements, political accords or any theory of delegation of authority. It is based on state consent. In the Advisory Opinion issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 19 July 2024, the ICJ discussed the relevance of the Oslo Accords for Israel's obligations under customary international law, holding that "the Oslo Accords cannot be understood to detract from Israel's obligations under the pertinent rules of international law applicable in

the Occupied Palestine Territory".[3] The pertinent rule of international law applicable in the OTP is Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that "Protected Persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power".[4] Under Article 148 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, no contracting party, including Israel can absolve itself of any liability for breaches under the Convention. Based on the Geneva Conventions, the Oslo Accords, therefore, cannot be interpreted as a legal barrier to the ICC's jurisdiction.

12. The question of the Oslo Accords in these proceedings pertains to *ratione personae,* not *ratione loci*. The ICC's territorial jurisdiction over the OPT was established by the PTC in its 'Decision on the "Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court's territorial jurisdiction in Palestine"'[5]. The PTC clarified that the Oslo Accords are irrelevant to determining the Court's territorial jurisdiction, stating that "the arguments regarding the Oslo Agreements in the context of the present proceedings are not pertinent to the resolution of the issue under consideration, *namely the scope of the Court's territorial jurisdiction in Palestine*"[6] [emphasis added]. Consequently, the PTC determined that such jurisdictional issues should be addressed "by interested States based on Article 19 of the Rome Statute, rather than in relation to a question of jurisdiction in connection with the initiation of an investigation by the Prosecutor".[7] The Court confirmed its authority to exercise jurisdiction over Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
13. In the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the PTC determined that a political agreement similar to the Oslo Accords, involving the International Security Assistance Force and the interim Government of Afghanistan, did not preclude the Court's jurisdiction over US forces. Although the decision to open an investigation into Afghanistan was appealed, the Appeals Chamber upheld the PTC's finding and emphasised the following:

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[3] *Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem* (Advisory Opinion) ICJ 19 July 2024, [102] <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf> accessed 30 July 2024.
[4] Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 42 United Nations Treaty Series 287 (Palestine accession 2 April 2014).
[5] *Situation in the State of Palestine* (Decision on the 'Prosecution Request Pursuant to Article 19(3) for a Ruling on the Court's Territorial Jurisdiction in Palestine') No. ICC-01/18 (5 February 2021).
[6] *Situation in the State of Palestine* (Decision on the 'Prosecution Request Pursuant to Article 19(3) for a Ruling on the Court's Territorial Jurisdiction in Palestine') No. ICC-01/18 (5 February 2021) [24].
[7] *Situation in the State of Palestine* (Decision on the 'Prosecution Request Pursuant to Article 19(3) for a Ruling on the Court's Territorial Jurisdiction in Palestine') ICC-01/18 (5 February 2021) [129].

> Arguments were also advanced during the hearing that certain agreements entered into between the United States and Afghanistan affect the jurisdiction of the Court and should be a factor in assessing the authorisation of the investigation. The Appeals Chamber is of the view that the effect of these agreements is not a matter for consideration in relation to the authorisation of an investigation under the statutory scheme. *As highlighted by the Prosecutor and LRV 1, article 19 allows States to raise challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court, while articles 97 and 98 include safeguards with respect to pre-existing treaty obligations and other international obligations that may affect the execution of requests under Part 9 of the Statute*. Thus, these issues may be raised by interested States should the circumstances require, but the arguments are not pertinent to the issue of the authorisation of an investigation.[8] [emphasis added].

14. Accordingly, political agreements such as the Oslo Accords do not affect the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction under the Rome Statute. This is particularly so where the objections raised in relation to the Oslo Accords generally, and Article XVII (2)(c)[9] specifically, contravene and contradict the statutory norms of the ICC and the peremptory norms of international law. In the *Lasva Valley* case, the ICTY stated that "[M]ost norms of international humanitarian law, in particular those prohibiting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, are also peremptory norms of international law or jus cogens, i.e. of a non-derogable and overriding character".[10] Giving effect to Article XVII(2)(c) of the Oslo Accords in these circumstances contradicts the text of the Rome Statute by creating a non-statutory amendment to the statute through bilateral agreements.
15. Article 21 of the Rome Statute sets out the applicable law that the Court must apply when interpreting the Statute's provisions. Article 21 states that the applicable law is the Statute "*in the first place*"[11] [emphasis added]. "In the second place", and where appropriate the Court must apply applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict. If these sources do not provide sufficient guidance, the Court is required to turn to the third source

[8] *Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan* (Appeal Judgment) ICC-02/17-138 (5 March 2020) [44].
[9] Article XVII (2)(c) of Annex IV of Oslo Accords II reads: "The territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council will apply to all persons, *except for Israelis*, unless otherwise provided in this agreement" [emphasis added].
[10] *Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al* ("Lasva Valley" Case) (Judgment) Case IT-95-16 (14 January 2000) [520].
[11] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3 (Rome Statute) Article 21.

of law in Article 21, namely general principles of law derived from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime where these principles "are not inconsistent with the Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards".

16. In the *Lubanga case*, the Appeals Chamber held that, if "a matter is exhaustively dealt with by [the Statute] or […] the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, […] no room is left for recourse to the second or third source of law to determine the presence or absence of a rule governing a given subject".[12] Additionally, under Article 21(3), the Court is obligated to interpret the provisions of the Rome Statute in a manner consistent with internationally recognised human rights. The drafters of the Rome Statute did not intend for political agreements to be considered in the interpretation of the Statute, reinforcing the independence of the ICC in delivering impartial justice.
17. Articles 25 (1) and (2) of the Rome Statute, outline the *ratione personae* questions for the Rome Statute.[13] Thus, in accordance with Article 21 of the Rome Statute, the Oslo Accords, a bilateral agreement, would not in fact have primacy as a source of law for the Court to decide on the question of *ratione personae.*
18. As outlined in Paragraph 4 of this submission, the Court has in fact established that it has jurisdiction over the OPT. Therefore, in accordance with Article 25(2), the Court has jurisdiction over a person who commits a crime within the OPT.
19. It will in fact be in contravention of Article 21 of the Rome Statute if the PTC gives the Oslo Accords primacy over the Rome Statute for the question of jurisdiction in *ratione personae.* Therefore, it is against the text and spirit of Article 21 to argue that there is a legal basis for a conflict between the Statute itself and the Oslo Accords.[14]

[12] *Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo* (Appeal Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/06-772 (14 December 2006) [34].
[13] Along with Article 25, Article 26 excludes jurisdiction for persons under 18, and Article 27 explicitly states that "Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person". Hence, the Statute has clearly demarcated cases of personal jurisdiction and their limitations. This regulation, combined with the clear effect of Article 21, would be violated by giving effect to Oslo accords, thus creating a non-statutory bilateral method to amend the statute (i.e. personal jurisdiction) contrary to the amendment mechanisms adopted in Articles 121 and 122.
[14] Besides the issue of primacy and hierarchy of laws according to Article 21, allowing such a non-statutory amendment through practice, giving effect to a bilateral agreement over the text of the Statute, contravenes with the mechanisms for amendment of the Statute, including Articles 121 and 122 of the Statute.

(c) The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction under the complementarity principle as there are no proceedings at the national level in Israel, resulting in a situation of inactivity

20. Under the Rome Statute, states have the primary responsibility for exercising their criminal jurisdiction over international crimes. However, where states fail to investigate and, where necessary, prosecute, the International Criminal Court must step in. The Appeals Chamber has argued that complementarity strikes a balance between safeguarding the primacy of domestic proceedings vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court on the one hand, and the goal of the Rome Statute to "put an end to impunity".[15]
21. Based on the Court's admissibility-related jurisprudence, any suggestion that it is too early for the PTC to issue arrest warrants on grounds of complementarity is incorrect. Complementarity is assessed by the OTP at the initial stages of a situation when determining whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the opening of an investigation, pursuant to Article 53(1)(b) of the Statute. The preliminary examination of this situation was concluded by the OTP on 20 December 2019, on the basis that all the statutory criteria under the Rome Statute for the opening of an investigation had been met. The PTC's decision of 5 February 2021, confirming its territorial jurisdiction in relation to Palestine, removed any doubt regarding Israel's obligation to carry out investigations into potential cases involving the commission of international crimes. This is particularly relevant given Israel's stance that Palestine cannot assert its criminal jurisdiction over Israeli nationals, an assertion which is challenged in this and several other observations.
22. The principle of complementary concerns the issue of admissibility,[16] and not of jurisdiction. It comes with specific criteria and limitations to prevent misuse and attempts by states to shield perpetrators of crimes within the Rome Statute. Under this principle, Israel must investigate the same individuals for substantially the same conduct as identified in the OTP's request for arrest warrants.[17] The phrase "is being investigated" in Article 17(1) means actively taking steps to determine if the suspects are responsible for the conduct, such as interviewing witnesses or suspects, collecting evidence, or conducting

[15] Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Appeal Judgment) No ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8 (25 September 2009) [85].
[16] Despite that we find no legal reason to engage in this issue here, we are concerned about future *mala fide* objections aimed at delaying the issuance of arrest warrants.
[17] *Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai, Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali* (Appeal Judgment) ICC-01/09-02/11 OA (30 August 2011) [39].

forensic analyses.[18] Simply being ready to take these steps or investigating other suspects is not enough. In order to claim that the same case is being investigated by both the Court and Israel, thereby avoiding a conflict of jurisdictions, concrete investigative steps should have already been taken at the national level in relation to the suspects involved in the Court's proceedings, as confirmed by the Appeals Chamber.[19]

23. This approach was subsequently applied by PTC III in the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire concerning the case of Simone Gbagbo. The PTC concluded that Côte d'Ivoire was inactive regarding the case, because "the investigative activities undertaken by the domestic authorities are not tangible, concrete and progressive, but, on the contrary, sparse and disparate".[20]

24. In addition, complementarity must be assessed against specific evidentiary thresholds. For a case to be deemed inadmissible, the state with jurisdiction must provide evidence demonstrating that it is indeed investigating the same or potential cases.[21] Evidence concerning, *inter alia*, the appropriateness of investigative measures, resource allocation, and the scope of investigative powers of those conducting an investigation may indicate a situation of domestic inactivity.[22] These factors also serve as relevant indicators of a state's willingness and ability genuinely to carry out proceedings in relation to the same or potential case as the OTP'.[23] The Prosecutor's preliminary examination found limited access to information about investigations in Israel, making the OTP's assessment of admissibility in terms of the scope and genuineness of relevant domestic proceedings ongoing.[24]

25. On the issue of "same conduct", in the *Gaddafi case*, the AC insisted that the domestic investigation "sufficiently mirrors the one the Prosecutor is investigating".[25] In a more flexible approach by the PTC in the *Al-Senussi* case, when interpreting the "substantially

[18] *Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai, Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali* (Appeal Judgment) ICC-01/09-02/11 OA (30 August 2011) [40].
[19] *Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai, Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali* (Appeal Judgment) ICC-01/09-02/11 OA (30 August 2011) [40].
[20] *Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo* (Decision on Côte d'Ivoire's Challenge to the Admissibility of the Case against Simone Gbagbo) ICC-02/11-01/12, PTC I (11 December 2014) [30], [65]; confirmed in *Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo* (Appeal Judgment) ICC-02/11-01/12 OA (27 May 2015) [39].
[21] *Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai, Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali* (Appeal Judgment) ICC-01/09-02/11 OA (30 August 2011) [2].
[22] *Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi* (Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi) No. ICC-01/11-01/11 (11 October 2013) [54].
[23] *Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi* (Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi) No. ICC-01/11-01/11 (11 October 2013) [54].
[24] Situation in Palestine, Summary of Preliminary Examinations Findings, 20 December 2019, para 2.
[25] *Prosecutor v Simone Gbagbo* (Decision on Côte d'Ivoire's Challenge to the Admissibility of the Case against Simone Gbagbo) ICC-02/11-01/12, PTC I (11 December 2014) [73].

the same conduct",[26] the PTC rejected the Prosecutor's insistence that national investigations must focus on substantially the "same incidents" as the OTP to satisfy the requirement. In its view, a more holistic comparison between the two investigations, focusing on their temporal, geographic and material parameters was needed.[27]

26. Since Israel's establishment, not a single senior military or political leader has been subject to legal proceedings by the Israeli judiciary over allegations of perpetrating international crimes including, those committed during the Nakba (1947-1949), the Sabra and Shatila massacres,[28] the first and second Intifadas, and multiple military attacks on Gaza in 2008-9, 2012, 2014 or 2021.[29] None have been held liable for these actions. The current attacks on Gaza follow this same pattern.
27. As of this submission, Israel has not indicated its intention to hold any serious investigation or prosecution against its senior military or political leaders for actions related to those mentioned in the OTP's request for arrest warrants. Even when adopting a flexible approach as seen in the *Al-Senussi* case, Israel is not meeting the requirements for questioning the admissibility on the basis of the principle of complementarity, since it is unwilling to undertake investigations against the persons that the Prosecutor has requested arrest warrants for.
28. With regards to the principle of complementarity, the criterion of inability, in our view, is relevant to the Palestinian judiciary. Should the Oslo Accords II: Annex IV - Protocol Concerning Legal Affairs: Article XVII(2)(c)[30] be deemed as preventing Palestinian courts from prosecuting Israeli nationals, a matter which is disputed, then this should automatically be translated as an additional reason for the Court exercising its jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute those crimes instead, especially in light of Israel's unwillingness to do so.
29. Furthermore, even in the hypothetical absence of such a bilateral limitation on the Palestinian judiciary's ability to try Israeli nationals, Palestine's political circumstances will not permit it to allow the judiciary such discretion. Palestine, as unequivocally confirmed

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[26] *Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi* (Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi) No. ICC-01/11-01/11 (11 October 2013) [75].
[27] *Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi*, (Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi) ICC-01/11-01/11, PTC I (11 October 2013) [75].
[28] UNGA Res 37/123D (16 December 1982) UN Doc A/RES/37/123 *"resolve[d] that the massacre [of Sabra and Shatila] was an act of genocide"*.
[29] Following each assault, Israel has issued a report approved by its Military Attorney General justifying its actions according to international law, dismissing the well-established evidence by the UN and other independent Commissions of Inquiry. Israel has never accepted responsibility for a single violation, and consequently never held responsible any of its senior leaders.
[30] "The territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council [referring to the Palestinian authorities] will apply to all persons, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this agreement."

by the latest Advisory Opinion of the ICJ,[31] is under unlawful military occupation, perpetuated by the State of Israel, over the totality of its territory. This includes the judiciary and the judges who are supposed to try Israeli nationals. A major part of the budget of the Palestinian government, including the judiciary, is controlled by Israel. The unlawful occupation, rather than the Oslo Accords, is the reason that the State of Palestine is "unable" to investigate or prosecute Israeli nationals.

IV. RELIEF SOUGHT

30. Law for Palestine:

a. Submits that the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed by Israeli nationals against Palestinians in the OPT under the Rome Statute.

31. Based on the above, Law for Palestine:

a. Requests the PTC to recognise and act upon the urgency of the situation, taking into account a) the objectives and *raison d'être* of the ICC according to the Preamble and operative provisions of the Rome Statute, and b) the gravity of crimes that have formed the object of the Office of the Prosecutor's efforts for over eleven years (since 2015).

b. Requests the PTC to dismiss any objections to its jurisdiction or its exercise of jurisdiction that could obstruct the functioning of the Court and the operation of international justice in the Situation in the State of Palestine or render it ineffective.

Law for Palestine[32]

Dated this 6th day of August 2024

Gothenburg, Sweden

[31] *Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem* (Advisory Opinion) ICJ 19 July 2024 <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf> accessed 30 July 2024.

[32] Law for Palestine would like to acknowledge that this submission was drafted and edited by (in alphabetical order): Abudagga, Huda; Ben Imran, Hassan; Chowdhury, N.; Edelbi, Souheir; Henderson, James; Kahwaji, Ahmad; Patel, Anisha; Sayed, Abdelghany; and Wazaz, Aya.